Civility as a Pedagogical Category[*]

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<ABSTRACT>

The role of manners and decent behavior for democratic ways of living are explored, as well as the role of truth claims in and for the political realm. On the one hand, it is argued that members of civil societies recognize the importance of truth claims that shape and limit the political sphere. On the other hand there is a focus on the social significance of decent behavior. Decent behavior may require the ability of distancing oneself from rigid pursuits and expressions of truth. From enlightenment and post-enlightenment perspectives, the importance of good behavior for a democratic way of life is easily underestimated. The notion of civility therefore is not particularly prominent in the debate on education and democracy which usually rather focuses on questions of competence. The article tries to highlight the ambivalence of civility which may be construed as the sum of sacrifices human beings have to make for living together. This ambivalence is rooted in the fact that civility means manners, distance and friendly appearances, i.e. also deception.

Keywords: civility, civic education, moral education, deception, manners, decent behavior, truth and democracy

I. Preliminary remarks

The focus of this contribution is twofold. The role of manners and decent behavior for democratic ways of living are explored, as well as the role of truth claims in and for the political realm. I will argue that members of civil societies recognize both, on the one hand, the importance of truth claims that shape – and limit – the political sphere, and, on the other, the importance of decent forms of

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conduct that keep on challenging the ability of distancing oneself from rigid pursuits of truth and a dogmatic imperative of truthfulness. It seems that these two practices and corresponding attitudes are interconnected in rather complex ways, one may speak of an entanglement. I am fully aware that the following considerations could be judged or labeled as (politically and educationally) "conservative" or "neo conservative". This would be – at least in my view – a misleading or wrong interpretation. Being able to distance oneself from otherwise justified claims in a situationally appropriate manner without giving them up is a feat of all well-behaving groups and individuals and of a decent society as a whole. The skills in question are to be learned and/or educated for all ways of living together – may they be labelled "conservative" or "progressive" or whatsoever; they function as preconditions of civil societies.

The importance of good behaviour for a democratic and social way of life is probably underestimated in enlightenment and post-enlightenment perspectives. And, of course, only laws and justice would seem to be convincing alternatives to "merely" contingent conventions. The following remarks are to bear out, first, the idea that basic civic behavior – which could, despite some denotative differences in the concepts, be construed as conventions and manners – is not simply a superfluous surplus but can be seen as a precondition for morality, law and politics. While there certainly exist superfluous or even dysfunctional customs and conventions the absence of which we would hardly notice, from an ontogenetic perspective it is evident that conventional judgement and action developmentally precedes moral judgement and action, even though children can already distinguish between morality and convention (if they are "properly" guided by questions). While civic and decent behaviour, here seen as a way of distancing from an all too authentic and spontaneous expression of emotion, on the one hand implies and presupposes a certain ethos of deception in living together socially, on the other hand it is undeniable that especially democratic politics and subpolitics can do away neither with a commitment to a fundamental truth, especially factual truth nor with the virtue of truthfulness. Of course, claims to truth can hardly be negotiated and tested in the political process. Furthermore, truth can hardly be said to count among political virtues. I will discuss to the latter issues in the second part of my presentation.

II. Merely conventional ...? The mean good and mean bad

The notion of civility is not particularly prominent in the debate on education and democracy which usually rather focuses on questions of competence. And, in this context, the notion of manners seems similarly arbitrary or marginal. Perhaps it is also unpopular, since it comes across as conservative, respectable and frumpy. But both notions are related and their history is manifold and entangled (Elwitz, 1973).

When egalitarian ideals started to rise in the 18th century and the courtly frame of reference towards which the ethics of the estate system and its etiquette were oriented (Vec, 2004: 98) became increasingly suspicious, morality and law gained impetus and the loss of good manners could appear more acceptable (Schneiders, 1985). Not only the common origins of morality, law and manners, but also the extant link between manners and morality as well as the function of manners for morality could all too easily be ignored by anticipatory enlightenment enthusiasm. The following way of having it is certainly overdone, but nonetheless we may mention it: "The century of Enlightenment leaves no trace of memory" (Vec, 2004: 98; trans. ROH[1]). But, in the wake of Norbert Elias' heavily-cited investigation into *The Civilizing Process* (1969), "civility" can also be understood as a special form of moderation and self-control that, in turn, is amenable to the peaceful co-existence of human beings (Alheit, 2000: 12; Döbler, 2000).

From the perspective of democracy theory or a democratic education the notion of "civility" is attractive, whereas the notion of "manners" may have sound depreciatory and "merely" conventional in that it might be seen as useful for living a pleasant life but not as fundamental as law and morality. Manners – *decorum* in Latin (Vec, 2004: 75) – refer to a category of norms that can potentially be applied to all spheres of human life (76). Their sources may remain diffuse, but they have a certain collectivist character (79). Laws and manners share the function of outwardly maintaining peace in society (83). The causes of the circumstance that customs – decorum, manners (the terms may be used interchangeably here) – do not have the same significance as

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1) Thanks to Robert Owen Hughes (ROH) who translated parts of this article.

laws or morality as analysed by Milos Vec in the context of his discussion of Christian Thomsius' theory. The latter wrote towards the end of the 17th and at the beginning of the 18th century and was highly aware of the problem. Regarding their content, customs were not taken to have the same dignity as laws and morality: "Imperatives to love one's neighbour like oneself or not to kill have a very different material pathos than conventions of addressing other people" (91; trans. ROH). *Decorum* only helps preventing "mean evils" and promoting the "mean good" (Grunert, cited in Vec, 2004: 92; trans. ROH). Therefore it is simply taken as being less important. Furthermore, decorum is not very attractive from an intellectual or theoretical point of view.

However, Thomasius' decorum theory can also be seen as an early theory of social norms dating back already to the pre-Enlightenment era (Vec, 2004: 96). From this point of view decorum is both norm and norm-fulfillment. As such it provides a stabilising kind for order in state and society (94). At the same time, however, it was clear to Thomasius that customs are subject to change[2]. The stability of customs is limited and therefore has a dynamic effect: "Customs differentiated according to the estate system are nothing more than transitory appearances of a changing society" (ibid.; trans. ROH). Imitating the customs of the higher estates had the effect that citizens did not align their behaviour with people of the same estate but strove for the habitus of those of higher status. Thus social distinctions became a motor for innovations (95).

Richard Sennett (1986) has convincingly illustrated how the public sphere in 18th century Europe was marked by societal conventions that regulated human behaviour. These conventions, which today would appear rigid, restrictive and artificial, made possible a distancing of a private sphere of sentiments from the public sphere, in which cosmopolitanism and politeness were demanded (71-171). However, depending on the cultural background, social conventions may still be rigid, restrictive and seem artificial in various ways. The clear definition of *public roles* (92-121) not only led to a certain degree of rigidity, it also made possible that strangers – including people of

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2) Eugen Fink (1987) succinctly writes: "The custom is alive."

different estates – could converse in a sociable and "mannerly" way without after a certain time having to, as Lasch has put it, "reveal their innermost secrets" (45; trans. ROH). The strict division of public and private sphere was not simply an antagonism.

The impulses governing the public sphere were will and artifice, whereas the private sphere was governed by the impulse to do away with anything artificial. The public sphere was 'creation', the balance of the two spheres has been maintained with a quality that today we would characterize as impersonal. The "individual character" is said to have been regulative neither for one nor the other sphere. The valid conventions of the public sphere were restricted only by "natural sympathies".

According to Sennett (1986), the demand for freedom went hand in hand with the deterioration of the contemporary self concept of man as an "actor" and "performer", as *public man*, since identity, seen as the intersection between what a person wants to be and what the world allows him/her to be, now had become an open question (143). The public man of that time is in no way to be seen as insensitive and without emotions, rather he/she can be taken as portraying or expressing emotions in the manner of an actor. This was further borne out by the old comparison of life with theatre or the stage and the terms that were used likewise on the stage and in the street: role, scene, drama, act, tragedy etc. (143-161).

The metaphor of *acting*, however, does not imply that the public man of the 18th century lived an "unreal" life full of deceit. In a system in which expression signifies the portrayal of emotion, according to Sennett (1986), man has an identity as an actor and performer, and this identity creates a social connection between him and the others. The identity of public man as an actor is due to the implementation of expression in portrayal. A cultural change with the result that related experiences no longer need to be dramatically implemented and according to which each individually related experience appears expressive gives the function of public man an air of redundancy – public man loses his/her identity (144). By contrast, man sought to attain a new and happier sensuality in the "theatrum mundi", as an actor the cosmopolitan was bound neither to nature nor Christian doctrine – the source of his joie *de* vivre were his/her interactions with others (146). A significant thesis of Sennett's is that the desire for individual authenticity and political tyranny are no

contradiction. Rather they go hand in hand. That is the core of Rousseau's prophecy, and as such it was fulfilled.

Sennett points out that the term 'tyranny', in its oldest political meaning, was used as a synonym of 'sovereignty' (1986: 424). What was meant was the idea of a (sovereign) ruler who tyrannizes society (with a principle). Such a principle need not be based on brute force, it could just as well be based on seduction. Furthermore, this principle need not be tied to a person, the tyrant. It may just as well lie in an institution that becomes the sole source of authority or in a general conviction that becomes the sole standard of reality (425). Precisely the latter was the case in the case of the "Tyranny of Intimacy" (ibid.): It determined a sole criterion of truth in "the heads of the people", according to which the whole of social reality was judged in its complexity (ibid.). And to the extent to which the seducing tyranny manages to assert itself, society suffers deformations (ibid.).

With intimacy as a call to reveal oneself, (all) interpersonal relations were brought into a certain perspective and certain expectations were formulated, especially the expectation to find interpersonal relations at a more and more local level and connected to this also the expectation that closeness creates warmth. These expectations of people tyrannized by intimacy, however, were disappointed: "The closer people get to one another, the more asocial, painful and destructive their relations to one another become" (Sennett, 1986: 425). As a conclusion, it seems that modern people pressurize one another to break down the barriers of customs, rules and gestures that stand against openness and frankness. "Truly" interpersonal relations are furthermore conceived as disclosures from personality to personality (427). Only thus can modern man satisfy his/her desire for authenticity in the anonymity of mass culture.

III. "Anstand ist Abstand" Decency as Distance

Yveline Fumat (2000) interprets civility as the art of keeping the right distance. The calculated inattention in the seemingly unimportant encounters of individuals, for

instance, in the streets of an urban environment, is a first important form of civility (104). One has to avoid physical collisions, direct gazes, gawking and any other kind of showing too much interest, likewise too much and sensitive closeness, physically as well as metaphorically: the other has to be able to maintain his/her face, discretion is called for. It is inappropriate to tell the other everything one knows about or thinks of him/her (it is unnecessary and may be destructive). Sometimes it is important to leave certain issues in the dark, sometimes it is important to present them in a certain, and perhaps not the brightest, light. A "mannerly" individual knows that the truth does not only enlighten, but can also be destructive – and what it destroys may very well be productive and "positive illusions" (Taylor, 1995), i.e. *preconceptions which make life more human.* The assumption that being completely without preconceptions would make the world more humane itself is a second-order preconception (i.e. a preconception about or against preconceptions). The faculty of judgement is also a faculty of preconceiving. However this may be, at times the "delusion of truthfulness ... must make way for the normality of ignorance and the half-light of discretion" (Hondrich, 2002: 163; trans. ROH). Civility is not morality but its precursor and *precondition* – and therefore should only be treated as such (Fumat, 2000: 107). Civility is an expression of the factual and fundamental appreciation *that the other exists, that he/she is a potential partner in interaction, that he/she is a human being with different relations and possibilities.* The moral and ethical dimension can only be based on civility. As such it is not a form of politics, but through the referential network and intersubjective relations it creates it may function as the basis of political life (ibid.). Also, civility does not refer to public-spiritedness nor does it aim at it: Individuals encounter one another, avoid one another, control themselves through use of polite forms of communication that belong to their repertoire and are socially given. And, independent of whether they do or do not want so, through their manners they create a common world, a pre-legislative order without which laws and institutions would be unimaginable. For this reason the loss of civility and manners, as has, for instance, been observed by Peyrat (2005) (and insofar it is validly diagnosed), is genuinely deplorable. For the most part, civic knowledge is implicit or latent in nature, in situations, however in which fundamental norms of decent conduct are violated, it

will, at least temporarily, become explicit or manifest.

"The way in which we react to the violation of implicit basic assumptions of mutual respect shows how deeply a civic habitus is rooted in our attitude to the world" (Alheit, 2000: 11). One is reminded of Goffman's insight that conventions of politeness are perceived as "mere conventions", as quasi-contingent and almost superfluous, but that their absence has an alarming effect. That there can be no security, no morality, no laws and no politics without civility is common knowledge. But this knowledge, also in the field of education, counts among the oft ignored and misunderstood matters of course (as seems to be borne out by the recent politically-charged debate on the importance of the academic discipline of education). Alongside families, schools in the public sphere seem to be a suitable place for learning and practicing the peaceful co-existence of people with no particular interest in one another. It is not the primary task of schools to be communities, and if they are, they are no models for a democratic society. Also, a school is not a polis which emerges among equals. Rather it is a compulsory institution where one can learn how to behave according to manners.

IV. "On permissible moral illusion" (Immanuel Kant)

Civil societies, as has already been argued above, are based on civility. Following Carter (1998), it can be construed as the sum of sacrifices we have to make for living together. But, first and foremost, civility means manners, distance and nice appearances, i.e. also deception. One may have qualms concerning the term 'deception' and suggest to use rather *mimesis* or *imitation* (Greek respectively Latin for "imitation"), but these terms, which are not used in contemporary theories of deception, do not really express the moral and ethical ambiguity that is associated with deception and is relevant for the present context. Even Kant, who commonly – and not without reason – is accused of moral rigour, had good things to say about deception. In his *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View* he writes under the heading "On

permissible moral illusion":

> In order to save virtue, or at least lead the human being to it, nature has wisely implanted in him the tendency to allow himself willingly to be deceived. Good, honorable *decorum* is an external illusion that instills *respect* in others ... – In general, everything that is called *propriety* (*decorum*) is of the same sort – namely nothing but *beautiful illusion* (1797/2006: 43-4).

It is probably not too far fetched to make a distinction between the moral and the social "Kant". The latter has a different orientation, so to speak: mutual deception, without lying and cheating, to Kant is the hallmark of a decent society that precisely from this deception draws its power of self-improvement:

> On the whole, the more civilized human beings are, the more they are actors. They adopt the illusion of affection, of respect for others, of modesty, and of unselfishness without deceiving anyone at all, because it is understood by everyone that nothing is meant sincerely by this. And it is also very good that this happens in the world (442).

In accordance with his pre-sociological theory of role-taking, Kant must, of course, once more make morality the focus of his observations:

> For when human beings play these roles, eventually the virtues, whose illusion they have merely affected for a considerable length of time, will gradually really be aroused and merge into the disposition (ibid.).

Nonetheless, *totally and permanently frank societies* would be unfriendly and barbaric associations of antipathy molecules, probably not even associations. Basically, honesty and openness have no adhesive function whatsoever, especially not in modern societies. Authenticity is an ideal for intimate relationships and not for institutional settings. In associations behaving according to manners it is common sense that it is not always about the Good, the beautiful and the true, but sometimes more importantly about the decent, the pleasant and the appropriate (thing to do), i.e. about feasible social arrangements under suboptimal conditions. Here the fanatical search for truth and quick judgement of others is seen sceptically. With a view to the 18th century, Sennett points out that "civilized man" lays great store by 'impersonality' and uses a language that avoids recourse to the speaker's identity (1994: 111). The advantages of a certain disguise lie (or lay) in the fact that it imbued the outside world with a

specific intrinsic value and freeing it from an obsessive inwardness (ibid.). While the 'mask of virtue', by proponents of Enlightenment, was seen as a symbol of civilization's falsehood, in the confusions in the wake of the French Revolution it could be observed which fatal consequences the 'strategy against superficiality' – against a pleasant appearance, so to speak – could have (114). What was called for now was laying bare one's genuine opinions, one's true identity, one's true self. Dangerous times: "The flaws of a civilized past, traces of prejudice, politeness, irony could become a social death sentence" (ibid.; trans. ROH).

The dispassionate middle course may be demoralizing, and the philosophy of tepidity (Garnier, 2001) may be a luxury. But manners represent a distance from oneself. It is about, to have it with Gracián, on the one hand, to act as though one were being observed (2004: 144–145), on the other, however, to belong entirely neither to the others nor to oneself (124) but to both only as much as necessary. That manners are of interest again – especially in the field of education – can possibly be seen as being symptomatic of a world in which people would like to totally possess and control each another, only to find out that they get lost in such attempts and can maintain a distance to themselves either tyranically or not at all.

Harry Frankfurt has recently written:

> It goes without saying that we need to take moral considerations seriously. In my opinion, however, the importance of morality in directing our lives tends to be exaggerated. Morality is less pertinent to the shaping of our preferences and to the guidance of our conduct – it tells us less of what we need to know about what we should value and how we should live – than is commonly presumed. It is also less authoritative. Even when it does have something to say, it does not necessarily have the last word (Frankfurt, 2004: 6).

Civility is not Morality, especially not because it shows features of deception which, in turn, will always remain ambivalent. Deception theorists like Nyberg (1996) or Buller and Burgoon (1996) seem less troubled. Nyberg writes: "To live *decently* with one another we do not need moral purity, we need discretion – which means *tact in regard with truth*" (Nyberg, 1996: 202; emphasis added).

V. Truth and Democracy

If one breaks down the major paradigms of modern democracy theory – Liberalism, Republicanism and Deliberation – to a central mechanism of stabilising the body politic, it can be said that liberal positions primarily point towards the usefulness of political and legal *institutions*, republican positions towards the *virtuousness* of citizens who see themselves as members of a community and are capable of compassion, and deliberative positions finally point to *procedures* in the service of an argumentative consensus (Schaal & Heidenreich, 2006: 192). Of course, these are accentuations: For institutions, virtues and discursive procedures do not exclude one another. In contrast to a liberal perspective, however, republican and deliberative positions lay special emphasis on the significance of democratic forms of participation (cf. also Gerhart, 2007). Participation can be construed as participating in, establishing or maintaining a public sphere. Its complement or opposite retreats to the private or intimate sphere.

In Habermas' *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere* (*Strukturwandel der Öffentlichkei*t; 1990/1962) at the latest, or also in Sennett's *Fall of Public Man* (1986/1974) the dissolution of the boundaries between the two spheres was diagnosed and especially "the privatization of the political sphere" was criticised. Benjamin Barber, for instance, in his critical comments on election secrecy compared voting with going to the toilet:

> our primary electoral act, voting, is ⋯ like using a public toilet: we wait in line with a crowd in order to close ourselves up in a small compartment where we can relieve ourselves in solitude and in privacy of our burden, pull a lever, and then, yielding to the next line, go silently home. Because our vote is secret – "private" – we do not need to explain or justify it to others (or, indeed, to ourselves) in a fashion that would require us to think publicly or politically (Barber, 2003: 188).

Going to the toilet represents a privatist understanding of democracy and democratic unscrupulousness. There is no need for justification in the province of political decision-making, there everyone may harm the commonwealth as much as they like. In the moment of decision making a public affair is transformed into a private act,

which would seem to be governed by concerns of maximization of individual utility rather than by public spirit (Schaal & Heidenreich, 2006: 166).

Participatory democracy in a "strong" communitarian sense does, however, come in for criticism not only as regards the implied utopia of permanently "vital discursive communities", but also as regards the suggested ideals of symmetry and community. The cratological element, i.e. the motivation towards power of all politics is not mentioned. Pateman's (1970) analysis of pseudo-participation, into which everyone is drawn by participation euphoria, seems to have gone unnoticed. Rulers and subjects are identical or, at least, should be. Pabst (2003: 9-33) has already pointed out the rather misleading construal of democracy, according to which it is taken to refer to the sovereignty of the people and as such should also be this. The Greek word *kratein*, however, means "to exert power" rather than "to be sovereign" - this is to be contrasted to *archein* (as in, for instance, "Olig*archy*"), which means "to be sovereign" ("Oligarchy" means "sovereignty of the few" and can be seen as the form of government most averse to democracy). In a democracy the *demos* holds power (over the government/those governing), but the people do not govern.

In such a view democratic knowledge could be understood as knowledge of power, and competent democrats would be world-oriented cratologists (power experts), politically educated individuals would not only know of the people's power (know-that) but would also know concrete practices of power which they could apply (know-how). Possibly political education would, on the whole, be more attractive if it were practiced with a view to a power theoretical perspective, however, it might then attract even more people with questionable motives.

In contrast to this assessment, political participation without lies and deception, as well as collective decision-making without stratagems and furtiveness, to the community theorist of the political, seem not only morally called for but also possible. Hannah Arendt's estimations are orthogonal to this. In *Wahrheit und Politik* (Arendt, 2006) she writes:

> No one has ever doubted that truth has a bad footing in politics, no one has ever counted truthfulness among the political virtues (9).

The question, however, remains contested what the state of truth can be if it proves so ineffectual in the *public world*. Political discourse is about facts and opinions – opinions can be discussed, facts cannot. Next to mathematical, scientific and philosophical truths Arendt points to politically significant and underestimated *factual* truths, without knowledge of which so-called freedom of speech would be a farce (23). Factual information inspires and keeps bounded political thought (ibid.). It is essential for the political discourse whether, for instance, it counts as a fact that there was an Armenian genocide or whether one can just as well say that the Armenians attacked Eastern Turkey. Since facts are not negotiable, they are outside all convention and voluntary assent and, as such, exchanging opinions about them does not in the least contribute to their establishment (27). While one can spar with, reject or compromise with unwelcome opinions, according to Arendt precisely those unwelcome states of affairs are of an immovable persistence that can be shaken by nothing other than by boldfaced lies (ibid.).

Currently we are faced with politics that no longer officially follow any "ideologies" or "world views", rather they use seemingly rational "methods" of problem solving, but also of warfare, with science marketing and image making as ancillaries. Like advertising executives, the influential systems analysts and game theorists of American politics live in a world detached from reality, trying to accommodate politics to their claimed scientific laws (Nanz, 2006: 73). We have, to some extent, become used to manipulated and selective reporting, but then repressing an independent press first attacks the free formation of opinions and ultimately judgement competence and a sense of truth. While the political sphere is extended, it is also limited and does not encompass the entirety of human existence. According to Arendt, what limits the political sphere are the things that people cannot change, that are outside their power and that, at best, can only temporarily be suspended in self-deception (Arendt, 2006: 61-62). Truth can be defined as "what man cannot change" (62; trans ROH).

Following Harry Frankfurt (2005), one could have it more drastically and say that cultures in which the difference between truth and humbug is no longer of interest are more precarious than cultures of lying. Whereas the liar – including the political liar – at least still is in contact with the truth, the producer of humbug or, to have it

with Frankfurt, the *bullshitter* is concerned merely with effect. For them, truths are only personal views which one may have or not, they are opinions about truths which have to be accepted as subjective products of highly personal learning processes. While, in a constructivist manner, one might say that bullshitter XY, in interaction with his/her environment and the development potential it provides, has created his/her *"own"* perspective of the world and acquired it by *"individual"* processes of adaptation and learning, common sense would say that XY has not learnt anything and is talking humbug. Indifference towards attempts at testing the universalizability of claims to truth is the central characteristic of a modern culture of humbug that takes pragmatism to the point of the dissolution of all principles.

Members of civil societies recognize both, on the one hand, the importance and basality of truth claims that shape the political sphere and the widest sense of a democratic ethos, and, on the other, the importance of decent forms of conduct that keep on challenging anew the ability of distancing oneself from rigid pursuits of truth and a dogmatic imperative of truthfulness. Being able to distance oneself from otherwise justified claims in a situationally appropriate manner without giving them up is a feat of mannerly groups and individuals.

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<국문초록>

교육학적 범주로서의 시민적 예의

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이 논문은 정치적 영역을 위한 정치적 영역에서의 진리 주장의 역할과 더불어, 민주적 삶의 양식을 위한 예의범절과 고상한 행동의 역할을 탐구하고자 한다. 한편으로, 시민 사회의 구성원들은 정치적 영역을 형성하고 경계지어주는 것으로서 진리 주장의 중요성을 인식하고 있다고 주장한다. 다른 한편으로는, 예의바르고 고상한 행동의 사회적 중요성에 초점을 맞춘다. 때로 고상한 행동은 진리의 엄격한 추구나 표현으로부터 거리를 둘 수 있는 있는 능력을 요구할 수 있다. 계몽주의와 후기 계몽주의의 관점은 민주적 삶의 양식을 위한 좋은 행동, 곧 시민적 예의의 중요성을 과소평가해왔다. 그리하여 '시민적 예의'라는 용어는, 주로 역량(competence)의 문제에 초점을 두어 온 교육과 민주주의의 논의에서 그다지 주목을 받지 못했다. 이 논문은 인간이 함께 살아가기 위해 감수해야 할 희생들이라고 볼 수 있는 시민적 예의의 양면성을 부각시키고자 한다. 이 양면성은 시민적 예의가 예의범절, 거리두기, 그리고 친절하게 꾸미는 외양 즉 일종의 속임 등을 의미한다는 사실에 근거하고 있다.

주제어: 시민적 예의, 시민교육, 도덕교육, 속임, 예의범절, 고상한 행동, 진리, 민주주의